



















SPACECRAFT TECHNOLOGY TRENDS IN THE 




Small communications satellites have been em-
ployed by the Amateur Radio community for over 
twenty five years. These satellites have been 
used by tens of thousands of radio amateurs 
for recreation, education and scientific inves-
tigation. The Amateur satellite program today 
is international in scope with nine countries 
having contributed space flight hardware to the 
overall effort. A total of 14 satellites have 
been fabricated in the OSCAR program resulting 
in 29 spacecraft-years of orbital experience. 
This paper will address the history of the 
spacecraft developed for the Amateur Satellite 
Service with emphasis on technology trends in 
the program. Particular emphasis will be placed 
upon the mass, cost, system capability and con-
struction phase duration for each of the four-
teen satellites of the OSCAR series. The 
Amateur satellite program has not simply adopted 
technology from other larger satellite programs. 
In many cases entirely unique design concepts 
were employed, required because of the small 
size of the spacecraft, the very limited power 
available or the limitation of fiscal resources. 
The development of high efficiency linear commu-
nications transponders and the design of highly 
integrated command, control and telemetry equip-
ment are two examples. For many years these 
techniques have been of little value to design-
ers of larger spacecraft, who have alternatives. 
With the new interest in l.1ghtweight satellites 
at low cost, these techniques may take on re-
newed applicability. 
INTRODUCTION 
Small communications satellites have been employed by the 
Amateur Radio community for over twenty five years. These 
satellites have been used by tens of thousands of radio ama-
teurs for recreation, education and scientific investigation. In 
recognition of the potential value of these activities, the 
International Telecommunications Union established, in 1971, the 
Amateur Satellite Service; a separate service from the Amateur 
(1) 
Radio Service but with common objectives. The Federal Communi-
cations Commission has followed suit in its Rules and Regula-
tions, Part 97, Subpart H. 
Spectrum has been allocated to the Amateur Satellite Service 
throughout the HF, VHF, UHF and microwave bands. The Amateur 
satellite program today is international in scope with nine 
countries having contributed space flight hardware to the over-
all effort. A total of 25 satellites have been fabricated in the 
world-wide Amateur Satellite program resulting in 29 spacecraft-
years of orbital experience to date. One of the satellites 
failed to achieve orbit due to a launch vehicle failure and one 
awaits launch on the new European ARIANE-4. 
This paper will address the history of the spacecraft developed 
for the Amateur Satellite Service with emphasis on technology 
trends in the program. Particular emphasis will be placed upon 
the mass, cost, system capability and construction phase dura-
tion for each of the fourteen satellites of the OSCAR series. 
The Amateur satellite program has not simply adopted technology 
from other larger satellite programs. In many cases entirely 
unique design concepts were employed, required because of the 
small size of the spacecraft, the very limited power available or 
the limitation of fiscal resources. The development of high 
efficiency linear communications transponders and the design of 
highly integrated command, control and telemetry equipment are 
two examples of these technologies. For many years these 
techniques have been of little value to designers of larger 
spacecraft, who have alternative technology options. With the 
new interest in lightweight satellites at low cost, these tech-
niques may take on renewed applicability. 
In the process of developing spacecraft of this nature, new 
strategies for environmental testing, component selection, mate-
rials selection, system redundancy and program management had 
to be developed. Some of these new strategies are driven by 
fiscal restraints, while others by manpower resources, these 
approaches differ significantly from conventional spacecraft pro-
grams. 
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 
The launch of the first artificial satellite, Sputnik I, excited 
the imaginations of a great many people around this globe. The 
world of Amateur Radio ("ham" radio) is one that historically has 
attracted devotees that have been filled with curiosity, inves-
tigation and "imagineering", all to create new methods and appli-
cations in the realm of radio communications. These two state-
ments, seemingly unconnected, converged about two years follow-
ing the launch of Sputnik I, with a group of California amateurs, 
incorporated as Project OSCAR, initiating a program to build an 








































years of their efforts, OSCAR I was launched on 12 December 1961 
as a "piggy-back" secondary payload aboard an Air Force Thor-
Agena launch vehicle carrying the Discovery XXXVI payload. 
These events have been suitably documented by Davidoff and 
others, starting with the visions of a magazine writer.l 
Oscar I was but the first of some 25 satellites, built by radio 
amateurs around the world, that have either been orbited or are 
planned to be launched. Fig. 1 chronicles the relentless pursuit 
of radio amateurs toward achieving highly reliable global commu-
nications with complete freedom from the effects of ionospheric 
propagation phenomena. The 40 years of past and future OSCAR 
activity shown provide the background of our experience and lay 
the plan for our future expectations. Fig. 2 is a log of the 
operating history of each of these satellites, presented with a 
logarithmic abscissa covering time from 1.2 days to 31.7 years. 
Note also that there are eleven Russian radio amateur satel-
lites that have been launched, the RS and Iskra series. As we 
have very little information on their construction and proper-
ties, further efforts to include them in this discussion is not 
practical. 
AM.SAI 
Starting with OSCAR 5, a new organization was formed for the 
exploitation of amateur radio satellites. Called the Radio 
Amateur Satellite Corporation, it is more commonly known as 
AMSAT, a successor to Project OSCAR in launching amateur satel-
lites. 
AMSAT has grown into an international organization and spun off 
a number of affiliate organizations in other countries. Most of 
the work done on amateur satellites in the last fifteen years 
has been done as international efforts, with one or more na-
tional group defining the basic spacecraft. This consortium has 
also provided the systems design and control and defined the 
subsystem interfaces. Substantial design flexibility exists in 
the subsystems, as long as their interface requirements are met, 
and the execution of these subsystems have been delegated to 
even other groups. Phase m satellites provide a good example 
of this process. The central consortium has been between (as 
we know it now) AMSAT-NA (AMSAT North America) and our West 
German colleagues, AMSAT-DL. Subsystems have been fabricated 
by Bulgarians, Japanese, Australians, South Africans and other 
national AMSAT groups. Even the spaceframe assembly in 
suburban Washington, DC, looked like a small United Nations. 
This decentralized, all volunteer army does have its drawbacks in 
managing a program, but the dividends are that the program can 
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Many of these volunteers are aerospace professionals on their 
own right, but the aura of an amateur spacecraft attracts them 
to contribute their time and talents to the program. 
QS.CAILfr.Qgram Phases 
The many spacecraft constructed by radio amateurs can be 
roughly classified by their intended function into four Phases. 
Phase I designs comprise low earth orbit (LEO), short lifetime 
beacon satellites, such as OSCARs I, II, m, 5 and Iskra 1 and 2. 
Phase II designs are also LEO (but not as Iowan altitude), long 
lifetime satellites with active transponders and experiments, 
such as OSCARs 6, 7 J and 8, UoSAT OSCARs 9 & U and RS 1-11. 
Phase m satellites are designed to function in elliptical Molnia-
type orbits at high altitudes, for long lifetimes and with wide 
area transponder coverage. Examples of Phase m satellites are 
the ill-fated Phase rnA, OSCAR 10, and the soon to be launched 
Phase mc. Phase IV satellites are now in the study and design 
phase and crown this development cycle with geosynchronous 
"constant" position orbits providing 24 hour/day communications 
over nearly half the globe per satellite. OSCAR IV was ahead of 
its time by 2.5 decades with a Phase IV mission, that we now 
plan for the early 1990s. 
OSCAR SATELLITE CHARACTERISTICS 
As would be expected in a progression of satellite designs cov-
ering 2.5 decades, substantial advancements have been made in 
the features and capabilities of the OSCARs. Correspondingly, 
satellite mass, cost and complexity have increased. OSCARs I 
and II were literally assembled in California home workshops in 
the originator's garages. Even substantial elements of OSCAR 10 
were concocted in home workshops and kitchen ovens, although 
that spacecraft was too large for a normal home workshop and 
required a more formal assembly laboratory. The Phase IVA 
spacecraft will be just too immense to place in anyone's shop, 
much less get through the doorways of all but the most special 
of commercial buildings. These size examples only illustrate our 
progress. 
Fig. 3 illustrates this spacecraft growth from OSCAR I to 
Phase IVA, with the increase of nearly 100 (actually 19.5 dB, for 
those who think in logarithmic terms) in spacecraft orbital mass. 
Similarly, power consumption, in our own miserly power budget 
terms, has grown by two to three decades, as shown in Fig. 4, 
although that data is considerably skewed by mission objectives 
and the available power sources employed. 
To further grasp the degree of evolution of the OSCAR satel-
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Telemetry Command Computer Highest 
Channels Channels Memory Frequency 
kByte MHz. 
---- -- -----
OSCAR I 1 0 144 
OSCAR II 1 0 144 
OSCAR III 2 0 145 
OSCAR IV 2 2 432 
OSCAR 5 7 2 144 
OSCAR 6 24 21 435 
OSCAR 7 96 70 2304 
OSCAR 8 6 5 435 
Phase IIIA 64 OBC 16 435 
U-OSCAR 9 105 OBC 32 10 GHz 
OSCAR 10 64 OBC 16 1270 
U-OSCAR 11 156 OBC 64 2400 
F-OSCAR 12 62 40 48 436 
Phase mc 64 OBC 32 2401 
Phase IVA "'128 OBC ",640 2402 
t\ote: OBC is On Board Computer 
Fig. 5 Amateur Satellite Capabilities 
OSCAR I No Transponder 
OSCAR II No Transponder 
OSCAR III 50 
OSCAR IV 10 
OSCAR 5 No Transponder 
OSCAR 6 100 
OSCAR 7 150 
OSCAR 8 200 
Phase lIlA 170 
U-OSCAR 9 Digital Tetemetry 
OSCAR 10 950 




Phase mc ' .500 
Phase IVA 1225 
1(f 10' 1(j 
Band wid th - kHz 
Fig. 6 Compounded Transponder Bandwidth 
(7) 
missions. Measures are in terms of the relative sophistication 
employed for information telemetry, control capabilities and 
transponder highest frequencies. In recent years the degree of 
control cannot be related to the number of channels employed as 
microprocessor on-board-computers (OBC) have changed that 
meaning, instead the measure is given in terms of the RAM mem-
ory carried aboard. 
~e more than 25 years ago we spoke about just being able to 
copy the single channel CW beacon of OSCAR I, these days, even 
in LEO satellites (Fuji OSCAR 12) we speak. in terms of copying 
the packet bulletin board system (PBBS) messages and leaving 
stored messages for other amateurs at other locations on this 
globe. This FO-12 activity has been witnessed, and viewed in 
awe, as this paper was being prepared. Meanwhile, the AFC 
locked phase-shift-keyed (PSK) modem automatically 'tracked the 
down-link information through all of its' signal Doppler shift, and 
the computer kept right on flashing all of the traffic onto the 
screen as the satellite passed. 
In Fig. 5 the information regarding highest frequency is a bit 
misleading, as while OSCAR 7 had a 231214 MHz beacon aboard, it 
could not be turned on for legal reasons, dictated by the FCC. 
For Phase mc and Phase IVA we are planning to employ this kind 
of 13 cm equipment in real transponder service. The principal 
transponder of Phase IV wUl be several band segments (separate 
transponders) of 24 cm uplink with 13 cm downlink, fairly advanced 
even for many of today's amateurs, but a very real need for 
that mission. These communications links are feasible today, and 
wUl be common place at the time of the expected Phase IVA 
launch. 
This advancement in communications transponder capabilities is 
more suitably Ulustrated in Fig. 6, showing the total compounded 
bandwidths of all transponders aboard the respective satellites. 
While the total bandwidth for OSCAR 1121 looks large. and it was 
actually flown with that capability, a single transistor failure 
in the 81210 kHz wide Mode L (24 cm uplink. 70 cm downlink) 
transponder reduced the gain and operationally effective band-
width of that unit to about 11210 kHz, makina the real total for 
OSCAR 1121 about 27121 kHz. The upcoming launch of Phase mc, with 
50121 kHz bandwidth presents a real improvement over predeces-
sors, and the 1.22 MHz bandwidth for Phase IV represents a sub-
stantial improvement over Phase TIlC. Most of the transponders 
have been linear translators, faithfully retransmitting their in-
put signals. Some recent transponders have deliberately not 
been linear. The digital tranponding functions of the DCE of the 
OoSAT OSCAR 11 and the Phase TIlC RODAK packet system are ex-
amples. 
To conclude this discussion on the prime payloads of the OSCAR 








































capability is shown in terms of a form of "gain-bandwidth" prod-
uct. Fig. 7 shows our version as a "power-bandwidth" product, 
EIRP-bandwidth in Watt-kiloHertz, to be specific. This measure 
accounts for transmitter antenna gain, transmitter power and 
bandwidth, all expressed as a single product. It can be seen 
that the plans for Phase IVA present a stupendous decade 
growth over even the ~ated value for OSCAR 10. Not normal-
ized in this process, however, are the mission requirements. The 
lower EIRP-B.W. for Fuji OSCAR 12 does not demean its perfor-
mance, as it is a long-life LEO satellite and produces quite 
strong signals despite its lower transponder output. 
Conversely, the Phase m and IV satellites need higher powers 
and antenna gains to provide usable signals from their 36,000 km 
altitudes. 
As the missions of the OSCAR satellites have become more· so-
phisticated, so too have the mel;hods employed for attitude 
control. Transponder antennas, even fairly simple ones, have 
directivity characteristics, and spacecraft attitude control is 
important to maintain useful communications links. Fig. 8 shows 
this progression of spacecraft control, running from no control 
on the earliest, to simple bar magnets, and further on to a 
complex computer controlled magnet system for active spin and 
attitude control. This last system is used on the Phase m 
satellites and senses Earth and Sun positions, computer pro-
cessing the data and controll.ing three sets of magnets for 
spacecraft spin and attitude. 2 The UoSAT program also uses 
magnetic torquing, but in conjunction with gravity gradient booms 
and magnetometry for attitude sensing. The Phase IV spacecraft 
will employ transponders with highly directive antennas that will 
require very precise attitude control in the body stab:i.l.ized 
mode at geosynchronous altitudes. We hope to employ a simple, 
low cost reaction control system for this Phase IV mission. 
As the attitude control needs have become more demanding, the 
microprocessor computer has made meeting these demands feasi-
ble. Pointing requirements have dictated that we are able to 
measure our position in space and the location of the Sun and 
Earth. While these needs are not at all new to the space in-
dustry, some of the solutions employed and proposed are unique. 
It should be noted that the space industry probably has as many 
solutions for position determination as there are satellites, 
this kind of measurement has had no really universal solution. 
Suffice, there are probably very few missions, even of the low-
cost small satellite field that will not require some sort of 
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Spin, Passive Magnets & Lossy Dampers 
Spin. Passive Magnets & Lossy Dampers 
Spin, Passive Magnets & Lossy Dampers 
Spin, Passive Magnets & Lossy Dampers 
Spin & Computer Operated Magnets 
Gravity Gradient Boom 
Spin & Computer Operated Magnets 
Gravity Gradient Boom & Active Magnets 
Spin, Passive Magnets & Lossy Dampers 
Spin & Computer Operated Magnets 
Earth Oriented Bod v Stabilized With 
Reaction Control :System 








































OSCAR SATELLITE COSTS AND EFFORT 
The discussion to this point has generally been on very quan-
tifiable terms of satellite design and performance. Entering the 
arena of the cost of an OSCAR satellite and how long it took to 
build become subjects that are difficult to grasp. One must 
first understand that while AMSAT's satellite builders may be 
well paid and respected professionals in their own diverse 
fields, they are truly volunteers when it comes to buildi.ng 
OSCAR satellites. Evaluating a fair-market-value for the labors 
of tirelessly applied volunteer efforts is next to impossible. 
Further, many companies in the aerospace industry knowingly con-
tributed to the programs in many diverse ways, such as autho-
rization of computer time resources for satellite design efforts, 
specialized components and many other countless contributions. 
Fig. 9 shows that while we have assembled satellites for very 
nominal monetary amounts of out-of-pocket funds, the trend of 
costs are escalating nearly five decades while the mass only 
grew two! These increases all despite the application of inno-
vative solutions to normally expensive problems. One cost that 
is now becoming substantial is that of a launch position. Most 
of the early OS CARs were launched for no fees at all, as there 
were usually excess launcher capacity available, or the launcher 
was new and experimental, as was the case of the ARIANE that 
was to launch the Phase mA spacecraft in 198121. The loss of 
that launcher was a hardship to the ESA program, and an abso-
lute disaster to the amateur satellite program. As launching 
facilities have become more experienced and and launches more 
routine we have been expected to underwrite some share of the 
integration and launch costs. This trend is expected to con-
tinue as space programs mature. 
Another impact to the cost picture is illustrated by the 
OSCAR 1121 effort. A substantial amount of the work needed was 
done in duplicate (e.g. the spaceframe) and this subsequently re-
duced the costs for its later sister spacecraft, Phase nac. 
Fig. 1121 sives some insight to the elapsed calendar time for the 
several OSCAR programs. Buried in this information is the trend 
that second and third models of a particular program have re-
quired less time to achieve. not a terribly surprising situation. 
The experience factor has been substantial. hence the Phase mA 
effort was 5.5 years. OSCAR 1121 was 2.5 years. and Phase mc 
only two years. A two year program seems to be the minimum, 
although some programs, through the application of super-human 
efforts have produced complex spacecraft. such as DoSAT 
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OSCAR PROGRAM EXECUTION 
This subject of constructing complex hardware projects with 
mostly volunteer labor cannot be left without commenting on the 
immensity of the differences in the management teclmiques that 
need to be applied. AMSAT"s procedure may seem harsh and 
leaderless to some, the process really sorts out those individu-
als who will perform with a major amount of self motivation, and 
those who are just along for the ride. This later group does 
not last very long on an AMSAT program. This yoke of volun-
teerism places demands on an AMSAT program manager that pale 
those placed on a manager of an all professional effort. 
Teclmical management on a low cost spacecraft program also re-
quires inventiveness in the process of evaluating the suitab~ty 
of components to do their job. Decisions also must be made on 
just how much testing of various system blocks is needed to 
provide a flight worthy confidence, without the cost overkill of 
a NASA or DOD program. 
Component testing varies from a full stress and test burn-in, to 
a simple value check measurement at assembly. The drivers on 
deciding these criteria are the confidence in the class of com-
ponent and its failure mechanisms. In some cases, by purchasing 
MIL-STD components, there is no individual component testing 
done at all, except at the subassembly level. 
Testing of subassemblies primarily are just those of an exten-
sive room temperature burn-in and functional test to sort out 
component and circuit infant mortalities. Environmental testing 
is relegated to the overall spacecraft integration level of as-
sembly. The success record provides some substantiation to 
these philosophies. Useful life termination of early spacecraft, 
such as OSCAR 6, 7 and 8, have been related to high battery 
temperature problems. This is a thermal design problem that has 
been solved on later programs by obtaining the services of 
qualified personnel in the design phases of the program, long 
before the fact of the failure mode. 
CONCLUSIONS 
AMSAT"s proven track record of successful spacecraft has given 
the confidence that we can build a geostationary class of 
satellite. We have to be very careful, however, as the size, 
cost and complexity of this kind of program may grow beyond 
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